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Abstract—This position paper introduces the concept of ar-
tificial “co-drivers” as an enabling technology for future intel-
ligent transportation systems. In Sections I and II, the design
principles of co-drivers are introduced and framed within gen-
eral human–robot interactions. Several contributing theories and
technologies are reviewed, specifically those relating to relevant
cognitive architectures, human-like sensory-motor strategies, and
the emulation theory of cognition. In Sections III and IV, we
present the co-driver developed for the EU project interactIVe
as an example instantiation of this notion, demonstrating how
it conforms to the given guidelines. We also present substantive
experimental results and clarify the limitations and performance
of the current implementation. In Sections IV and V, we analyze
the impact of the co-driver technology. In particular, we identify a
range of application fields, showing how it constitutes a universal
enabling technology for both smart vehicles and cooperative
systems, and naturally sets out a program for future research.
Index Terms—Advanced driver assistance systems (ADAS),
artificial cognitive systems, emulation theory of cognition, intel-
ligent vehicles, man–machine systems, optimal control (OC).
I. INTRODUCTION—TOWARD HUMAN PEER VEHICLES
R ESEARCH in intelligent transportation systems began inthe late 1980s with the PATH program in the United
States, the PROMETHEUS project in the EU, and the ASV
projects in Japan. While one line of research centered on fully
autonomous vehicles, the vast majority of research projects has
focused on driver assistance systems [1], [2] as a recognized
component of vehicle–human interaction research. The princi-
ples of smart collaboration between humans and systems have
been the focus of a number of theoretical studies, such as those
by Inagaki [3], Flemisch et al. [4], Norman [5], Heide and
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Fig. 1. Example scenario: The host vehicle travels in traffic that exhibits
potentially dangerous locations, complex road features, and multiple possible
goals.
Henning [6], Li et al. [7], and others, which may include full
automation as one extreme point of the interaction spectrum [8].
A. Introducing Co-Drivers
Fig. 1 describes an example situation of typical complexity.
One main focus of this paper will be to identify a tech-
nological roadmap that is capable of giving rise to smart
collaborative control of the types described in [3]–[7]. With
this respect, Wang’s multiagent framework of “simple inside
vehicles, complex outside vehicles” and ACP-based parallel
approach of “actual versus artificial” are also closely relevant
[9], [10].
For the purpose of this paper, we first address the preliminary
question:
How would a human driver drive?
Depending on its application context, a system capable of de-
termining how an expert human would drive could be regarded
either as a kind of “holistic driver model” or as an “artificial
human-like driver.” (For readers interested in the state-of-the-
art of driver modeling, reviews are given in [11] and [12].)
Such an artificial driver would be sufficient for developing
autonomous vehicles that move and react as if driven by a
human. However, this would still be insufficient, in itself, for
developing meaningful interactions with a human driver.
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On inspection of Fig. 1, it is clear that we cannot easily
tell how a human would drive without knowing his/her goal/
intentions. In fact, a human would drive in distinctly different
ways depending on whether his/her goal is d, or a−c, or a−b.
Definition: We therefore conceive the notion of a “co-
driver”: an artificial agent that is able both to drive similar to
a human and to infer human intentions, interacting accordingly,
including rectifying mistakenly executed actions by the human
driver.
II. CO-DRIVER ENABLING TECHNOLOGIES
A. Natural Co-Drivers
We note that “natural” co-drivers already exist. A driving
license tutor would be a first obvious example: The tutor has
knowledge of human motion schemes and is able to infer
the trainee’s intentions, thus acting on the vehicle controls in
accordance with the trainee’s needs, given the context.
In colloquial terms, it is obvious that the human co-driver
can “understand” the trainee. How this actually happens will be
a central concern for the agent development arguments set out
below.
Note that this co-driver relationship is not limited to hu-
man intelligences. The rider–horse metaphor (or H-metaphor)
describes a symbiotic system, in which an animal can “read”
human intentions, and, reciprocally, the rider can “read” the
animal’s intentions [4], [5], with the horse seeking to maxi-
mally reduce the human’s riding burdens consistent with their
intentions.
B. Architectural Considerations
The first consideration concerns the agent architecture. Let
us first consider the so-called “sense–think–act” architecture
[see Fig. 2(a)], which has been often used in driver assistance
systems (e.g., perception–situation assessment–action). This
architecture corresponds to the traditional view of psychology
and artificial intelligence [13]–[15], known also as the computer
metaphor, which divides the agent’s functioning into sequential
steps. The scope of perception in this context is thus making an
“internal model” of the world, which is thereafter symbolically
manipulated by a “mind,” and subsequently fed into an output
buffer. Internal models have been introduced since the works of
Craik [16] and Newell and Simon [14] to explain how agents
may act beyond simply reactive behaviors, such as making
plans for things that they cannot currently sense.
A contrasting view is the behavioral architecture introduced
by Brooks [17] [see Fig. 2(b)]. This architecture starts with
simple sensory-motor loops, representing elementary behav-
iors (e.g., obstacle avoidance) and grows by adding behav-
ioral layers that subsume the already implemented layers to
achieve newer and more complex functions. In contrast to
the sense–think–act architecture, the agent is here decomposed
by horizontal levels of competence enacted via control loops
without explicit internal models of the world.
Brook’s architecture is one of the many new ideas that, since
late 1980s, challenged the traditional view of cognition (the
Fig. 2. (a) The traditional view of cognition decomposes agents in sequential
steps, e.g., sense–think–act. (b) The embodied cognition paradigm sees agents
as perception–action behaviors organized in hierarchies, with higher levels
subsuming lower levels, that are produced as the agent evolves via interaction
with its own body and the environment.
computer metaphor), along with connectionism, ethological
approaches, adaptive behaviors, dynamic systems theory, etc.,
together constituting the so-called embodied situated cogni-
tive science approach [18]–[32]. According to these, cognition
arises from the interaction of the agent with the environment,
with action typically preceding perception, and driving the
evolution of the agent [see Fig. 2(b)].
The two contrasting views have been extensively debated, not
only in terms of questioning the idea of cognition as amodal
symbol manipulation but also in terms of the related concept
of “internal (symbolic) representation” [32]–[40]. Although
some researchers supported the idea of “intelligence without
any representation” at all (e.g., [21], [29], and [32]), other
researchers have developed novel concepts of “representation”
[33]–[39] among which emulators [40], [41], which can be
used for anticipation of sensory input, predictive and optimal
control (traits that have been long recognized in driver mod-
els [11], [12]), deliberation (going beyond reactive behavior),
imitation, learning, empathy, mind reading, and cooperation
[42]–[62] (e.g., see a review by Hesslow [45]).
The sense–think–act architecture (in the form perception–
situation assessment–action) has hitherto been the natural
choice for systems that were fully engineered by design, as is
the case for most driver assistance systems. For example, the
authors employed it in the PReVENT project [63], [64]. How-
ever, as the complexity of the driver support function grew, the
known shortcomings of this type of architecture [17] became
evident (particularly in terms of scalability, maintainability,
flexibility, and robustness).
The behavioral architecture has also been used in intelligent
vehicles, particularly within the project DIPLECS [65], which
adopted the architecture in Fig. 2(b), with layers inspired by
the Extended Control Model (ECOM) [66]–[68], which is a
psychological driver model that seeks to explain driving as a
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hierarchy of concurrent subsumptive control loops that execute
at progressively decreasing time scales (i.e., such that the
more abstract layers typically operate over longer time scales).
DIPLECS implemented the three bottom-most ECOM layers:
tracking (minute chassis control and disturbance rejection),
regulating (producing space–time trajectories), and monitoring
(keeping track of the progress toward the destination and setting
related short-term goals, e.g., overtaking). Each layer was built
from learned perception–action cycles [69]–[77].
C. Empathic Link and Joint Action
The Simulation Theory of Cognition is a conceptual frame-
work [45] that essentially states that “thinking is simulation
of perception and action,” carried out as covert motor-sensory
activity, e.g., [42], [46], and [50].
In this framework, the understanding of others’ intentions is
also a simulation process, carried out via the “mirroring” of ob-
served motor activities of the others, e.g., [43], [51], [52], [62]
(colloquially speaking: “standing in the shoes of others”). The
“like me” framework [62] for understanding others’ intentions
is summarized by Meltzoff as: “others who act like me have
internal states like me.”
Not only are humans skilled in the latter but they can also
intrinsically correct mistakes in the execution of tasks while
preserving the ultimate goal. For example, in the experiment re-
ported by Meltzoff, 18-month-old children are able to correctly
execute a task that has been incorrectly demonstrated [61].
Inference of intentions has also been further studied by
Wolpert et al. [52], [53], [60], [78], [79] and Demiris et al. [55]–
[59], [80], [81]: Their approach is to generate agent behaviors
under a number of alternative hypotheses, which are then tested
by comparison with observed behaviors. This means that “mul-
tiple simulations” are run in parallel, and the most salient one(s)
are selected. This method is termed the “generative” approach.
Hurley, in 2008, combined many ideas into an interpretative
scheme named the Shared Circuit Model [51]. In the following,
we adopt Hurley’s picture as a useful frame of reference.
In broad terms, Fig. 3 indicates an agent capable of interact-
ing with the environment (the outer dashed loop) in agreement
with the embodied cognition approach. However, in the Hurley
model, details are also provided for the inner structure of the
agent.
The main element is the existence of an internal loop that
goes backwards from action to perception. This posited loop is
a forward emulator, which simulates the effect of agent motor
activity as if it were produced in actuality (a key contribution
here is due to Grush [40]). In overt motor activities, these
cerebellar circuits [41], fed by “efference” copies of the motor
commands, anticipate sensory input. A parallelism with control
theory can be drawn, where predictive models can be used to
stabilize sparse noisy sensory input (by analogy to Kalman
filters), to enhance the processing of sensorial information, as
trackers (retaining awareness of things coming into and out
of the senses), and to implement efficient (model) predictive
control. The usefulness of forward emulators extends to covert
motor activities, where they may be used offline to produce
motor imagery; to estimate the effect of hypothetical actions;
Fig. 3. Architecture of a cognitive agent equipped with emulation and mir-
roring, capable of imitation, mind reading, and deliberation (the Share Circuit
Model, see text).
to develop and evaluate plans, such as model-based planning
in control theory (e.g., model-predictive control and Optimal
Control); and finally, to simulate the observed actions of other
people.
D. Sensory-Motor Cycles That are “Human-Like”
Many researchers have focused on human movement and
on how it accords to efficiency principles built in the cen-
tral nervous system. In this respect, Todorov et al. [82]–[84],
Wolpert et al. [79], [85], Harris [86], [87], Viviani and Flash
[88], Flash et al. [89]–[91], and many others (going back to the
1970s) show evidence that biological beings move according
to optimal criteria. In particular, Harris and Wolpert indicate
minimization of postmovement errors and rejection of neural
noise (the “minimum variance” principle) to be the underlying
efficiency criterion, capable of explaining observed human
time–accuracy tradeoff and the so-called “two-thirds power
law” (see below).
Optimal Control is thus a convenient means to reproduce
simple sensory-motor primitives, e.g., as demonstrated in [83]
and [92]. Optimal inverse emulators (see Fig. 3) may be derived
with this principle.
Application of OC within a receding-horizon scheme ex-
plains another observed fact, known as the “minimum inter-
vention principle” [93], [94], which states that task-irrelevant
deviations are left uncorrected.
Viviani and Flash [88], Flash et al. [89], [91], and others
also showed that lateral acceleration and speed in human move-
ments are inversely correlated with curvature (the “two-thirds
power law”), which Harris explains as a consequence of the
minimum variance principle. Within driving, an analogous phe-
nomenon exists: Ordinary drivers use lateral acceleration and
speed in inverse correlation with road curvature (far below that
appropriate to friction limits on dry roads and, thus, unrelated
to it). This phenomenon was independently observed and called
the “willingness envelope” in [95]–[98]. In [98], Bosetti et al.
demonstrate what is plausibly the same “two-thirds power law,”
originating from the minimum variance principle (i.e., drivers
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reduce speed in curves to maintain the accuracy in lateral
position).
III. CO-DRIVER OF THE INTERACTIVE PROJECT
A. Theoretical Foundations and Design Guidelines
The main goal is to design an agent that is capable of
enacting the “like me” framework, which means that it must
have sensory-motor strategies similar to that of a human and
that it must be capable of using them to mirror human behavior
for inference of intentions and human–machine interaction.
Designing human motor strategies is a relatively easy step:
One may take inspiration from human optimality motor prin-
ciples. For example, we already used the minimum jerk/time
tradeoff and the acceleration willingness envelope to produce
human “reference maneuvers” for advanced driver assistance
systems (ADAS) [63], [92], [93].
Implementing inference of intentions by mirroring, and
human-peer interactions, is the second less assured step. Two
notable examples (MOSAIC and HAMMER) have been men-
tioned for the general robotics application domain. In the
driving domain, DIPLECS demonstrated learning of the ECOM
structure from human-driving expert-annotated training sets,
and classification of human driver states. However, no co-
driver, in the sense of the definition given in Section I, has been
demonstrated as yet.
The main research question and contribution of this paper is
thus producing a co-driver example implementation to demon-
strate the effectiveness of the simulation/mirroring mechanism
and the following interactions and to focus on the important
potential application impacts that follow from these.
The co-driver has been developed by a combination of direct
synthesis (OC) at the motor primitive level, as well as manual
tuning at higher behavioral levels (the latter being carried
out after inspection of salient situations whenever the two
agents happen to disagree). The final system is thus the cu-
mulation of having compared correct human behaviors (while
discarding incorrect human behaviors) with the developing
agent within many situations encountered during months of
development.
However, in Section VI, we describe how the same archi-
tecture can be potentially employed in the future to implement
“learning by simulation,” namely, optimizing higher-level be-
haviors with simulated interactions via the forward emulators,
to let the system build knowledge automatically (instead of
manually), particularly to accommodate rare events and to
continuously improve its reliability.
Note that, while the main purpose of this system is “un-
derstanding” human goals for preventive safety (see below),
emergency handling and efficient vehicle control intervention
may be added by means of new behaviors (no longer necessarily
human-like) in future versions.
B. Example Implementation
“InteractIVe” is the current flagship project of the European
Commission in the intelligent vehicle domain [99]. It tackles
Fig. 4. Architecture of the co-driver for the CRF implementation of the
Continuous Support function.
vehicle safety in a systematic way by means of three different
subprojects focusing on different time scales: from early holis-
tic preventive safety, to automatic collision avoidance, and to
collision mitigation.
Preventive safety deals with normal driving and with pre-
venting dangerous situations. For this, a “continuous-support
function” has been conceived, which monitors driving and acts
whenever necessary. This functionality integrates, in a unique
human–machine interaction, several distinct forms of the driver
assistance system.
To implement the Continuous Support function, the co-driver
metaphor was adopted. It has been implemented within four
demonstrators of differing kinds. The following describes the
Centro Ricerche Fiat (CRF) implementation, which is closest
to the premises in Section II.
C. Co-Driver Architecture (CRF Implementation)
Fig. 4 shows the adopted architecture. The agent’s “body” is
the car, the agent’s “environment” is the road and its users, and
the “motor output” is the longitudinal and lateral control.
This architecture may be seen to resemble that in Fig. 3,
albeit extended in that the perception–action link is here ex-
plicitly expanded into a subsumptive hierarchy of PA loops.
As indicated in Section II, the input/output structure of layers
within the subsumption hierarchy is characterized by (progres-
sive generalizations of) perceptions and actions. The actual
implementation is built up from functions with input and output
characteristics described in the following section.
By comparison to Fig. 2(b), this architecture is enriched
with forward/inverse models, which make it possible to operate
offline for any purposes requiring “extended deliberation,” e.g.,
for human intention recognition.
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D. Building Block Details
1) Forward Emulators: While the concept of forward emu-
lation is quite general—for instance denoting neural networks
that can predict any sensory input, e.g., [40] and [41]—in our
implementation, emulators are focused on a restricted domain,
i.e., the prediction of the lateral and longitudinal host vehicle
dynamics.
There are many vehicle dynamics models in the literature
that might be adopted. Generally, they are designed to predict
vehicle dynamics accurately and efficiently for the design and
analysis of chassis dynamics and control systems (e.g., see
classical textbooks on vehicle dynamics such as [100]).
However, the main purpose of a predictive model here is
slightly different: It serves to test the viability of different
hypotheses of human driving intentions. Thus, its main require-
ment is similarity to humans (if not, co-driver predictions will
not match observations even for a correct hypothesis).
With these considerations in mind, we adopted the longitu-
dinal and lateral forward emulators described in Appendix I.
They are quasi-static models that ignore transient phenomena
that are unlikely to be conducted by humans because of the
limited frequency response of humans in either sensing or
actuation. On the other hand, they capture phenomena such
as sideslip and understeering, which, if otherwise ignored,
would lead to a mismatch between the human and the co-
driver. In other words, we make the assumption that slow, if
nonlinear, phenomena are capable of being human-directed,
whereas faster ones are not.
Note that we do not claim that the models given in
Appendix I are necessarily the best choice. Rather, they con-
stitute a working hypothesis to be tested. In a later section, we
will discuss the strengths and limitations of this approach.
2) Inverse Models: In this implementation, inverse models
are produced by means of OC. Other approaches may be based
on machine learning; for example, the learning of either or
both inverse and forward models, e.g., [101]–[116]. OC, with
criteria derived from human movement [86], produces motor
primitives that need know only the forward model (even if the
forward models were learnt, we would not need to learn any
corresponding inverse model).
Inverse models link perceptual goals to the actions needed
to achieve those goals (see Fig. 4). For the dynamic system
described in Appendix I, perceptual goals are desired states
to be achieved at some time horizon T . Thus, inverse models
determine the (optimal) control required to reach a desired state
at some future time T . Since there may be several types of final
states and optimization criteria, the inversion problem produces
a corresponding number of solutions, which we may regard as
different motor primitives.
In the proposed architecture in Fig. 4, the block labeled
“inversion by OC” denotes the algorithm for solving the OC
problem, whereas the lowest level behaviors of the ECOM ar-
chitectures are the motor primitives, which may be conceptually
thought of as instantiations of the OC problem.
3) First ECOM Layer—Motor Primitives: In the following,
the motor primitives that we determined to be most useful are
described.
a) Longitudinal motor primitives: Longitudinal motor
primitives deal with the adaptation of speed. They are generated
by the following OC problem:
Minimize the following cost functional with final time T as
a free parameter:
Js =
T∫
0
wT + j
2
p(t) dt (1)
subject to:
a) The forward model, given by (A1.2) in Appendix I.
b) The initial conditions, i.e., the current state
ss(0) = ss,0 u(0) = u0 a(0) = a0. (2)
c) The final conditions, i.e., the motor goal. We consider two
particular types of goal in the following, which produce
two primitives.
The cost functional (1) is worth noting. It is formulated as a
tradeoff between minimum jerk (jp) and minimum time (wT )
to model a variety of longitudinal behaviors, from minimum
effort (wT = 0), to different degrees of time constraint for exe-
cution (with ideally minimum time maneuvering for wT → ∞).
Thus, wT plays the role of a motivation parameter, modeling
how fast the intention can be executed or the tradeoff between
speed and accuracy inherent in any human movement.
Speed Matching (SM): The first motor primitive achieves a
desired uniform speed uT at a given location xT . It is thus
produced by the following OC final conditions:
ss(T ) = xT u(T ) = uT a(T ) = 0. (3)
Let us represent the solution of the OC problem for this case
in a compact form as
ss = ss,SM (t, xT , uT , wT )
u =uSM (t, xT , uT , wT )
a = aSM (t, xT , uT , wT )
jp = jp,SM (t, xT , uT , wT ). (4)
That is, the SM motor primitives are functions of time and
of parameters such as the target final state uT , xT and the time
pressure wT . In cognitive systems terminology, uT , xT can be
considered “perceptual goals,” whereas wT would stand for an
inner motivation state.
The time horizon T that optimizes (1) is a function of uT ,
xT , and wT , i.e.,
T = TSM (xT , uT , wT ). (5)
The actual computation of (4) and (5) may be carried out in
several ways. For instance, we have developed efficient meth-
ods to solve OC problems [64], [117]–[120]; a variation of this,
which exploits symbolic computation and the inherent simplic-
ity of the forward models, is used here (e.g., see Appendix I-C).
Other possibilities may be, e.g., online perception–action learn-
ing, such as used in DIPLECS.
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Speed Adaptation (SA): A second type of longitudinal motor
primitive is the adaptation of speed. It differs from SM in
that the location at which speed uT has to be reached is
unconstrained, i.e.,
ss(T ) = free u(T ) = uT a(T ) = 0. (6)
In a similar fashion to SM, we may conceptually think
that SA motor primitives are parametric in target speed uT
and motivation wT , obtaining equations analogous to (4) and
(5), i.e.,
ss = ss,SA(t, uT , wT )
u =uSA(t, uT , wT )
a = aSA(t, uT , wT )
jp = jp,SA(t, uT,wT ) (7)
T =TSA(uT , wT ). (8)
b) Lateral motor primitives: Lateral motor primitives
deal with the adaptation of travel direction and lateral position.
They are generated by the following OC problem:
Minimize the cost functional below with respect to a given
final time T
Jn =
T∫
0
j2Δ(t) dt (9)
subject to:
d) The forward model, given by (A1.1) in Appendix I.
e) The initial conditions, i.e., the current state
sn(0) = sn,0 α(0) = α0 Δ(0) = Δ0. (10)
f) The final conditions, i.e., the motor goal. As for the
longitudinal case, we have two classes of motor primitives.
It is worth noting that in (9), there is no equivalent to wT
in (1). That is why the lateral OC problem (9) is formulated
in an alternative way as a fixed final time T : The time T at
which the motor primitive has to be completed here plays the
role of wT .
Lateral Displacement (LD): This motor primitive involves
adjusting the lateral position in the lane. This is described by
the following final goals:
sn(T ) = sn,T α(T ) = 0 Δ(T ) = κT . (11)
That is, at the end of a movement of duration T , the lateral
position must be sn,T , the travel direction must be parallel to the
lane, and the trajectory curvature must match the lane curvature.
The resulting motor primitive is parametric in sn,T and T
(one motor goal and one motivation parameter), i.e.,
sn = sn,LD(t, sn,T , T )
α =αLD(t, sn,T , T )
Δ =ΔLD(t, sn,T , T )
jΔ = jΔ,LD(t, sn,T , T ). (12)
Lane Alignment (LA): This primitive assumes that, sooner or
later, the travel direction will be realigned with the lane and that
the curvature will match the lane curvature κ. This process is
presumed to occur in a time T and describes the lane-following
task in so far as the driver is not concerned about the lateral
position. The goals for this motor primitive are
sn(T ) = free α(T ) = 0 Δ(T ) = κT . (13)
The corresponding primitive may be concisely summarized
as a function of one parameter only (time T to alignment). Thus
sn = sn,LA(t, T )
α =αLA(t, T )
Δ =ΔLA(t, T )
jΔ = jΔ,LA(t, T ). (14)
Summing up, we have defined four motor primitives: one that
achieves a specified speed at a specified location, another that
adapts speed, a third that reaches a target lateral position, and
a final one that realigns the travel direction to the lane. These
form the bottom layer of the ECOM architecture in Fig. 4.
Of course, other primitives are possible, but these are suffi-
cient for the current co-driver implementation.
4) Second Layer—Simple Trajectories Dealing With Obsta-
cles or Lanes: The second behavioral layer in Fig. 4 combines
the given motor units to achieve simple maneuvers that individ-
ually deal with a single obstacle, lane, or road feature (curve or
landmark) at a time.
a) Obstacles: To deal with obstacles, a predictive model
of obstacle motion is first needed. One approach would be to
carry out inference of the observed vehicle intentions the same
way that we carry out inference of host vehicle intentions,
namely, reusing the framework we are developing.
However, although a fascinating research possibility, we
opted not to use this approach here for a number of practical
reasons: the speed and direction of travel of other vehicles is
known with less accuracy than one’s own, acceleration mea-
surement tends to be unreliable, other driver controls are not
directly observable, and a view of the road network from the
host vehicle perspective is not easily available. These limita-
tions could of course be overcome in future cooperative systems
applications.
Follow Object (FO): The purpose of this maneuver is to
approach a preceding vehicle, as in Fig. 1 using maneuver a,
producing a desired time headway gap th.
The simplified obstacle longitudinal motion model assumes
that longitudinal velocity vo (i.e., the obstacle velocity pro-
jected onto lane direction) is fairly constant. To deal with
accelerating obstacles, we rely on the continuous updating of
motor plans in receding-horizon iterations. In Section IV, we
discuss the limitations of this simplification.
The FollowObject maneuver is thus a perception–action map,
which takes as input the object, the desired time headway, and
the time pressure parameter wT and returns an SM primitive
FollowObject : (object, th, wT ) → SM(xT , uT , wT ). (15)
250 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INTELLIGENT TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS, VOL. 16, NO. 1, FEBRUARY 2015
Fig. 5. Evasive maneuvers.
This means computing the target point xT and velocity uT
that correspond to following the object as required, i.e.,
uT = vo
xT = so + voT − voth − lo (16)
where lo is a longitudinal clearance that accounts for the
lengths of the host vehicle and obstacle plus any extra desired
clearance, voth is the aimed-at time headway gap, so is the
initial distance of the object, and T is the maneuver duration,
which is obtained by solving (16) together with (5).
The FollowObject function thus instantiates an SM primitive.
In Fig. 4, arrows between two levels indicate this form of
input/output relationship.
The current value of the longitudinal control, i.e.,
jp,0 = jp,SM (0, xT , uT , wT ) (17)
is here of particular significance, because it indicates how the
co-driver ought to drive now to follow the object, which can be
directly compared with the longitudinal control that the human
driver employs.
Note that the followed object does not need to be in the
host vehicle’s lane for this function to apply. If it is traveling
in a parallel lane, including the case where it is behind the
host car, then this function may be used to compute maneuvers
that, for example, open a gap before a lane change may be
executed.
Clear Object (CO): The purpose of this maneuver is to
clear a frontal object on either side of the host vehicle (see
Fig. 5).
As indicated, understanding the directional intentions of the
object vehicle would ideally require knowing the road network
to find which lane the obstacle might be following. Since, in
the present version of the system, we only know the geometry
of our own road/lane, what we can do is to assess whether the
object is moving in our own road or whether it is moving across
the road, in which case our understanding of its intentions will
be correspondingly degraded.
If the object were moving in our road, its lateral movement
would follow a model similar to (14), i.e., the object would
sooner or later realign with the lane. Since we cannot measure
the curvature of the object trajectory directly, we simplify the
problem by setting Δ0 = 0 in (10), and κ(.) = 0 in (A1.1).
With these simplifications, the OC problem given by (9), (10),
(A1.1), (13) can be analytically solved, yielding the approx-
imate predictive model for object lateral motion employed
here, i.e.,
sn = sn,0 + vnt
[
1 −
(
t
T ∗
)2
+
1
2
(
t
T ∗
)3]
. (18)
Note that the model contains a parameter T ∗, which stands
for how long the object maneuver will last: in essence, a kind of
intentional assessment. At this point, we do not try to estimate
T ∗ but use the heuristically derived figure T ∗ ∼ 2.5 s (see also
the following section and Section IV).
The maximum LD of the object will be achieved at t = T ∗
sn,max = sn,0 + vn
T ∗
2
. (19)
If this position falls within one lane of the current object lane,
then model (18) is confirmed (i.e., we assume that the object is
following our road, possibly changing one lane only). If not,
the object is considered to be crossing our road. In this case, its
transverse motion is taken to be uniform, i.e.,
sn = sn,0 + vnt. (20)
With an object predictive model (in our case, the simple
equations 16-first, 18, 20), we can now compute evasive ma-
neuvers, as Fig. 5 shows. The dark vehicle is the obstacle, and
the dashed trajectory is its predicted motion. Even if we had
a more sophisticated obstacle intention prediction, the process
hereafter would be the same: first compute the encounter time
T ◦ by combining the longitudinal motion models; then produce
an LD primitive (i.e., parameters sn,T and T ) such that a
specified clearance c0 is obtained at T ◦.
The ClearObject function returns two LD primitives, i.e., one
for clearing on the left (l) and another for clearing on the right
(r). Thus
ClearObject : (object, c0) → LD(sn,T , T ). (21)
The given format implies that the second layer function
“ClearObject” produces the parameters sn,T and T of the first
layer “LD” motor primitive (thus subsuming it) that clears the
specified object at the specified distance c0, which necessarily
accounts for the width of the two vehicles plus any desired
clearance. The sign of c0 may be conveniently used to specify
whether the clearing occurs to the right or to the left.
The given ClearObject behavior is simplified: First, there is
only one hypothesis for T ; second, there is also one hypothesis
only for the longitudinal control used during the evasive ma-
neuver, which is FF (below) with a plausible value for wT . A
discussion of this simplification is given in Section IV.
b) Lanes:
Free Flow (FF): This maneuver produces an SA primitive
by guessing a target speed uT . This is achieved by assuming a
plausible value for T and solving (8) for uT , i.e.,
FreeFlow : (wT , T ) → SA(uT , wT ). (22)
Strictly speaking, FreeFlow should be a function of two
parameters, with T dictating how long the acceleration lasts.
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However, since T weakly influences the first part of the maneu-
ver, the co-driver always generates only one hypothesis for T
(which is 5 s) and relies on receding-horizon updates to refine
the estimate of the latter part of the maneuver.
Lane Follow (LF): This is a wrapper for the LA/LD motor
primitives. It takes as input a desired lateral position in a
specified lane (in lane units) and the maneuver time T and
returns an LD or an LA primitive (the latter if the final lateral
position is free), i.e.,
LaneFollow : (lane, position, T ) → LD(sn, T ). (23)
LandMark/SpeedLimit (LM): Landmarks are used to repre-
sent speed limits at specified locations such as at the beginning
of a road section with a posted speed limit. The Landmark
function takes the speed limit and position and returns an SM
primitive (making only one hypothesis for wT ), i.e.,
LandMark : (speed limit, position) → SM(xT , uT , wT ).
(24)
Curve (CU): This returns an SM primitive that approaches
a curve with the correct speed. We use curvature data from
ADAS digital maps to compute the appropriate location. The
speed is derived from the two-thirds power law [98], with
two hypotheses representing two different percentiles of driver
lateral acceleration. Only one hypothesis is made for wT , i.e.,
Curve : (curve, driver percentile) → SM(xT , uT , wT ).
(25)
5) Third Layer—Navigation: So far, the functions of the
second layer may be regarded as operators that translate simple
goals, considered separately, into motor primitives. Except for
CO, they return either a longitudinal or a lateral primitive.
The third layer is thus responsible for putting together
these potential motor tasks into executable navigation plans.
In other words, the third layer produces maneuvers (coupled
longitudinal/lateral motor plans) that represent higher-level in-
tentions, such as a, b, c, and d in Fig. 1.
It is worth noting that this layer still produces multiple
maneuvers. For an autonomous system, they represent covert
motor alternatives, such as in Fig. 1, from among which to
choose. For a co-driver, they constitute hypotheses to be tested
against the observed behavior of the driver.
The co-driver thus needs to produce a number of hypothetical
motor activities spanning the space of possible intentions. To
generate a complete set of hypotheses, the co-driver starts
guessing what the lateral intentions of the driver might be. For
a single road, with possibly multiple lanes, it thus generates an
ensemble of LF motor tasks as shown in Fig. 6.
Three of these, labeled 1–3 in Fig. 6, are of type LA,
with three hypotheses for the alignment time T ∈ {T1, T2, T3}.
These will serve to test whether the driver is going to simply
realign with the lane without any particular care for the exact
lateral position in it. In our implementation, the times T1, T2, T3
are set at 3, 1.5, and 1 s, respectively, with the first two turning
out to be the most frequent matches.
Fig. 6. Hypotheses for the lateral intentions of the human driver.
In addition, the co-driver makes 11 hypotheses of type LD,
labeled 4–14 (12), in which the final lateral position sn,T spans
three lanes, from the adjacent right lane to the left lane in
steps of 0.25 lane widths (see Fig. 6). Note that the hypothesis
labeled 9, corresponding to sn,T = 0, which represents the
intention to return to the center of the lane. Hypotheses 8 and
10 are, respectively, 0.25 lanes off-center, which approximate
the intention to move near to one edge of the lane. Hypotheses
7 and 11 represent the intention to go over the lane divider
(possibly as the beginning of a lane change), and the remaining
hypotheses are complete lane changes. Note also that, while
in Fig. 6 there is no right lane at all, hypotheses 4–7 are
nonetheless generated, which represent “running out” of the
lane. The reason for this excess hypothesis generation is also
to test for possibly incorrect driver actions.
In the case of road forks, such as in Fig. 1, another array
of hypotheses similar to those mentioned would be needed
to accommodate the bifurcation. This has not, as yet, been
implemented within the system.
The next step is the association of each lateral motor plan
with one (or more) longitudinal plan.
Obstacles are first considered: for each, the FollowObject and
ClearObject maneuvers are computed [with the same T in (21)
as in (12)]. Then:
— If the ith lateral maneuver (see Fig. 6) clears all the
obstacles, then it is associated to a FreeFlow longitudinal
primitive representing the intention of traveling along
a noncolliding path. For simplicity, we make only one
hypothesis for the FF parameter, i.e., wT (a value that
represents “calm” driving), because it is not as important
to understand how fast the driver wishes to drive in
this case.
— If the ith lateral maneuver (see Fig. 6) falls within
the l−r interval of one or more objects, then the Fol-
lowObject maneuver for the most demanding object is
selected. In this case, we make two hypotheses for the
time headway th, which are 1.1 and 0.6 s.
Curves are then considered: For every curve, the CU primi-
tive is computed, and the most demanding one retained. This is
associated with all the trajectories sharing the same road path,
e.g., in Fig. 1, a, c, and d share the most demanding curve
primitive of the main road path, and b of the bifurcation path.
Finally, landmarks and speed limits are considered the same
way as for curves.
After the given process, we end up with a list of maneuvers
with both lateral and longitudinal control of two types: the first
are trajectories that do not collide with obstacles, which are
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associated to FreeFlow longitudinal control; the second are tra-
jectories that might collide with an object, which are associated
with two hypotheses for longitudinal control, corresponding to
tight and very tight time headway. In addition, every maneuver
is also associated with an alternative curve and a landmark
longitudinal primitive. The reason for keeping the longitudinal
primitives separate, instead of taking the most critical one, is
the same as for the out-of-lane hypotheses in Fig. 6. That is,
to test for mistakes, such as being able to understand that a
driver may be approaching the front vehicle correctly but not
a curve within the same road (or perhaps the driver has ignored
the speed limits).
6) Fourth Layer—Strategy: The topmost layer is where in-
ference of intentions is completed and interactions are born. For
a correct inference of intentions, the hypotheses generated at
layer 3 must thus be tested. We use a saliency-based approach,
which considers both the “distance” between the hypothesis and
the driver behavior and also the “plausibility” of the hypothesis
itself. For the ith candidate maneuver, a penalty is therefore
computed as
Ji = wΔ ‖jΔ − j∗Δ‖2 + wp
∥∥jp − j∗p∥∥2 + wnJn. (26)
The first term is the square of a proper distance function
between the co-driver steering control jΔ(t) and driver control
j∗Δ(t) with weight wΔ. The second term is the distance between
the longitudinal controls, jp(t) versus j∗p(t) with weight wp.
These two together measure the “distance” between the driver
and the ith co-driver hypothesis.
The third term is the steering cost of the maneuver as defined
by (9). Adding this term means that maneuvers with higher
steering costs are considered less plausible. Thus, for instance,
a maneuver that requires less steering activity such as going
straighter would be preferred to one that steers more, for the
same distance to the driver behavior. However, we have not
included a similar term for the longitudinal control (1).
The computation of the distance between driver and co-driver
maneuvers implies a time window for the comparison, which
determines a tradeoff between accuracy and delay of inferred
intentions (longer observations may be more accurate but cause
more delay).
Our implementation aims at quickly discriminating among
the tactical maneuvers of layer 3 and, thus, uses nearly instanta-
neous comparison windows: For every hypothesis, the current
values of the predicted longitudinal and lateral controls, i.e.,
jΔ(0) and jp(0), are respectively compared with a 200-ms first-
order filtered value of the steering wheel rate j¯∗Δ and with a
Kalman estimation of the longitudinal jerk j¯∗p, i.e.,
Ji=wΔf
− (jΔ(0)− j¯∗Δ)2 + wp
[
jp(0)− j¯∗p
]2
+
1
T
Jn. (27)
The function f− is the negative part, returning zero if the
co-driver is faster than the human driver.
Let us, for convenience, introduce the representation in
Fig. 7, which shows the control output space: the steering wheel
rate jΔ in abscissa and the longitudinal jerk jp in ordinate. A
maneuver is represented here by a curve parameterized by time,
such as in the last terms of (12) and (7).
Fig. 7. Chart representing the projection of the system states onto the motor
output space.
Conceptually, this chart may be regarded as a projection
of the internal state of the cognitive systems onto the motor
output space. This is inspired by embodied cognition, in which
perception–action links imply that internal perceptual states of
the system may be represented in terms of their motor output or
a common code [121]–[123].
In the chart, the vertical lines labeled 1–14 represent the
lateral control jΔ(0) of each lateral motor primitive generated
at layer 3, e.g., those in Fig. 6. The two overlapping rectangles
stand for two vehicles, which can be seen in the inset. The
tallest rectangle is the nearer car. Rectangles are bounded by the
left and right ClearObject maneuvers and by the FollowObject
maneuver at the bottom side.
The cross markers (×) are the maneuvers produced at
layer 3. Maneuvers 4–7 clear both objects on the right and
are associated with FF longitudinal primitives, whereas the
others are associated with the FO primitives. Since there are
two hypotheses for time headway (th = 1.1 s and th = 0.6 s),
there are indeed two FO primitives for each trajectory. For
clarity, we show only one (th = 0.6 s), except for the example
trajectory 13, in which the second one is shown in light gray
(th = 1.1 s).
In the case given here, there is no critical curve and no
landmark in front of the vehicle. If there were, additional
maneuvers would be generated for every trajectory such as
those shown in dotted circles.
The filled and empty circles, respectively, trajectories 1 and
7, are the matching co-driver maneuvers.
The filled circle “co-driver (1)” corresponds to criterion
(27) with wp = 0. By weighting only the lateral control, this
maneuver represents the intentional trajectory of the driver.
Conversely, maneuver “co-driver (2)” uses a large weight wp
and typically preserves the longitudinal speed, producing an
evasive maneuver.
The reason for selecting two maneuvers here is related to the
specific use of the co-driver in the CRF application (see below).
Other usage might instead require the identification of one
maneuver, which can be achieved via a uniqueness-weighting
scheme.
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E. CRF Co-Driver Use and Human–Machine Interactions
In the CRF implementation, the co-driver is used as a tutor,
exploiting the two given alternative maneuvers.
For maneuver “(1),” the co-driver determines whether the
longitudinal control jp corresponds to a correct maneuver or,
if not, which longitudinal control should be used. For example,
suppose that the “co-driver (1)” maneuver were trajectory 13
with th = 0.6 s. In this case, the correct maneuver should
be at least 13 with th = 1.1 s (not considering landmarks or
curves that might be present), and the co-driver would also
then implicitly know how to rectify the driver’s behavior. This
information is thus used by the HMI of the continuous-support
function, which is inactive when the driver’s maneuvering is
correct but produces a feedback with the required correction
(and the cause of activation) otherwise.
The co-driver also establishes whether the lateral control
is correct, and this information is also used by the HMI for
lateral feedback. For instance, trajectory 13 corresponds to a
prohibited lane and would produce lateral feedback if chosen
(the same happens if the driver selects a lane that is occupied
by a lateral/rear vehicle).
The evasive maneuver “co-driver (2)” is an alternative option
for rectifying driver mistakes, which acts on the lateral control
instead. By way of example, in Fig. 7, the co-driver “sees” that
it is possible to change lane to the right to preserve longitudinal
speed. Within the CRF implementation, evasive maneuvers are
used to a limited extent in two cases: 1) If the evasive maneuver
is within the same lane of the primary maneuver, which happens
for example if an obstacle occupies only part of the lane, such
as a vehicle on a nearby lane but very close to or slightly inside
our lane, in which case this maneuver is selected for generating
feedback in place of the original maneuver. Thus, the driver will
not receive longitudinal feedback but rather a lateral feedback,
e.g., because he/she must open a greater clearance with respect
to a vehicle very close to or slightly inside the lane. It is worth
noting how “adaptive lane keeping” is thus produced from more
basic principles that reproduce human driving. The second case
occurs 2) when “co-driver (1)” is a correct lane change but
with short front time headway, and “co-driver (2)” is FF in the
current lane. In this case “co-driver (2)” is used for feedback,
indicating to the driver that he/she should better remain in the
current lane.
IV. EXPERIMENT AND RESULTS
The system has been tested with ordinary drivers on public
roads. The test route was a 53-km loop from CRF headquarters
in Orbassano (Turin, Italy) to Pinerolo, Piossasco and back,
which included urban arterials, extra urban roads, motorways,
roundabouts, ramps, and intersections. The test vehicle is
equipped with sensors to detect obstacles and lane geometry, on
board maps with road geometry, GPS receiver for positioning
on the map, and human–machine interface (HMI) devices to
generate warnings and haptic feedbacks for the driver based
on output from co-driver implementation running at a 10-Hz
update rate. In the test, 24 subjects drove twice, with active or
inactive HMI in random order. A total of 35 hours of logs have
Fig. 8. (Top) Difference in longitudinal acceleration between the two agents.
(Center) Distribution of acceleration difference. (Bottom) Distribution of lateral
position difference.
been collected, including sensor data, co-driver output, and
images from a front camera. More details may be found in [98].
This section focuses on the results that compare the covert
driving of the co-driver to the real driving of the driver.
A first indicator, to assess whether the two agents agree,
are the distance metrics (26) or (27). However, when the two
agents disagree, to assess the reason, it is necessary to manually
inspect the recordings. Reasons for mismatch may be 1) poorly
optimized co-driver (frequent during development), 2) percep-
tion noise, 3) driver error, and 4) simple difference of “opinion”
between the two agents (see below).
Fig. 8(a) shows an example situation, which happened 1.1 s
before the event depicted in Fig. 7, when, for the first time, the
co-driver detected a risk for maneuver 1.
Fig. 8(a) compares the longitudinal acceleration of the two
agents: The driver did nothing for approximately the next sec-
ond (in the meantime, a warning was issued). Then, beginning
at about 1.1 s, the driver used the same longitudinal acceleration
the co-driver planned 1 s earlier. Later, after ∼3.7 s, the driver
departs again from the (current) co-driver plan. In this example,
the difference between the two agents may be attributed to a
delayed reaction of the human driver and (after 3.7 s) to sudden
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Fig. 9. Comparison of driver and co-driver on a 10-min course. (Top) Longitudinal dynamics (see text). (Bottom) Lateral dynamics.
brake release, accepting a slightly short time headway (0.9 s)
for a while.
If the difference between the two agents (driver minus co-
driver acceleration) is plotted for all frames together, a distribu-
tion similar to that in Fig. 8(b) is obtained. Similarly, for lateral
control, the difference between the lateral positions (co-driver
minus driver) yields the distribution in Fig. 8(c).
Before commenting further, let us introduce Fig. 9, which
provides a different interpretation, looking at data during a
course sample of 10 min.
Fig. 9(a) thus plots the average difference of the two agents’
acceleration in the 5-s prediction window [i.e., the mean of the
differences shown in Fig. 8(a)].
In a, d, e, and similar situations later, the human driver em-
ploys relatively high accelerations in low gears. The co-driver
does not try to discover exactly how fast the human would like
to drive because it is not important: these are FreeFlow states.
Another reason for mismatch occurs in situations similar to
b. This case corresponds to a FollowObject state (15), which
happens when the longitudinal control is limited by obstacles
ahead. FO states are marked with vertical bands (light green in
the online version of the paper). In the FollowObject state (such
as in b) a typical pattern is often observed: As the vehicle ahead
gets closer, the difference between co-driver acceleration plans
and the real driver execution increases (the driver going faster)
until the co-driver state switches to short (between 1.1 and 0.6 s)
and very short (below 0.6 s) time headway. Note that this is not
the current time headway but the time headway goal used in
(15), which may be reached at the end of the motor unit, i.e., the
intention of the driver. A yellow or red warning is issued by the
HMI, marked with gray dents in the bands, for short (less than
1.1 s) or very short (less than 0.6 s) intentional time headways.
These two reasons together explain the upper part of the
distribution in Fig. 8(b), with the 0.0025 quantiles curve cor-
responding to the largest differences occurring in a dangerous
situation. Thus, the quantiles curve peaks at approximately 2–3
s in the future (related to delayed reaction of the driver).
Mismatches of the opposite sign (the driver using less ac-
celeration than the co-driver) primarily occur before curves,
such as c and g, which are, however, at a roundabout entrance.
The driver, approaching a ’yield’ sign, reduces speed more
than simply required by the curve (and sometimes even stops),
presumably for visibility reasons that are not considered by the
co-driver. This discrepancy is not dangerous. The condition in
f is instead one curve where the driver goes faster. However,
not faster enough to trigger a dangerous curve state.
The “slowness” of the driver explains the lower part in
Fig. 8(b).
Overall, the two agents disagree for three reasons, of which
one is incorrect driver behavior, the other two being concretely
different choices, in which one of the two opts for going slower.
The root mean square of the acceleration mismatch is
0.25 m/s2, which is approximately the darker strip in Fig. 8(b).
Fig. 9(b) deals with the lateral dynamics. A partly rectified
representation is used, which shows the lane changes. Both
trajectory and prediction error are plotted (respectively violet
and blue in the online version). The lane edges, as seen from
the lane recognition camera, are shown, and the lane itself is
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Fig. 10. Complex geometry at false-alarm points.
Fig. 11. Detection of the intention to overtake (the camera view for this is
given by the top-right frame in Fig. 12).
shaded. Non-motorway sections, including ramps and round-
abouts, exhibit a quite complex geometry. Note how close the
driver passes to edges during transitions (e.g., taking the first
exit ramp at cycle ∼700). The numbered light green bands stand
for the lane changes. The interval between when the LD motor
primitive predicts the lane crossing and the actual crossing of
the lane is shaded. There are 21 changes correctly predicted,
with anticipation ranging from 1.1 to 2.4 s (median 1.6 s).
There are two false crossing predictions, labeled a and b, that
happen in the non-motorway section when the trajectory passes
close to edges. Fig. 10 shows the camera view to demonstrate
how demanding this situation actually is. Despite the false
prediction, the absolute value of the lateral prediction error is
limited (a fraction of the vehicle width). Non-motorway seg-
ments are characterized by often-irregular lane geometry, with
splitting and merging lanes, often with missing marking traits
[see Fig. 10(b)], or else the camera failing to recognize them.
Fig. 8(c) shows that 0.0025 quantile curves, i.e., 99.5% of
the LD motor primitives, depart from the real trajectory for less
than one quarter of a lane in 2 s, less than half a lane in 2.5 s,
and less than one full lane in 5 s. The points where larger
deviations happen may be seen in Fig. 9 (the prediction error
is plotted). They are typically at inversions of the heading angle
and in complex geometries (a and b).
In Fig. 9(b), the dashed blue vertical lines before lane
changes 2, 6, 10, 14, and 18, mark the point where the co-
driver switches from FollowObject (second-level) behavior to
ClearObject behavior. This is the point where the agent realizes
that the human intention may be to overtake.
For example, Fig. 11 shows the control output space 4.1 s
before lane change 18, showing how the driver is going to
choose the overtake maneuver.
These events represent a different form of inference of inten-
tions, pertaining to a higher cognitive level, which are detected
by the switching from FollowObject to ClearObject second-
level behaviors, with the intention to overtake being not yet
manifested in terms of LD motor primitives.
This happens with anticipation ranging from 1.6 to 8.1 s
(median 4.1 s).
Fig. 12 summarizes the situations for the five lane changes
with overtaking. It shows the camera view when the overtake
intention is detected (first row), when the lane crossing is pre-
dicted (center), and when it actually takes place (bottom). The
last element of the first row, at the top right, is associated with
Fig. 11. In case 14, the “overtake” state and the “lane crossing”
state simultaneously happen, when the left lane becomes free
(fourth column in Fig. 12).
A. Comparison With Other Approaches Within the Literature
A number of alternative approaches exist in the literature
for prediction of intent in driving. A review is given by
Doshi and Trivedi [124], and Lethaus et al. focused on gaze
in [125].
The vast majority of methods are classifiers that learn and
recognize stereotyped head or gaze patterns preceding action
execution. Preattentive vision may also be important [74].
While these methods may use a variety of algorithms (e.g.,
hidden Markov models, neural networks of various kinds, and
Bayesian networks), they belong to a single class of inten-
tion inference methods termed as “action-to-goal” (Csibra and
Gergely [126]), which predicts the “likely outcome of ongoing
activity.”
Conversely, the method of this paper belongs to the “goal-
to-action” approach, which is also defined as “teleological,”
which means that actions are functional to some end [126]
and consequential to that end. The teleological interpretation
thus moves from a plausible goal to a generation (from which
the method is also termed “generative” [55]) of the expected
sequence of actions, with the granularity level sufficient for
comparison with observed actions. It thus anticipates expected
actions before they actually begin (if they do not begin, a
revision of the intentions is carried out) and is hence termed
“predictive tracking of dynamic actions” [126].
The prediction of overtaking, for maneuvers 2, 6, 10, 14, and
18 is one example of “goal-to-action.” It is obtained because
the overtake maneuver is the only one that has meaning (see
Fig. 11) within the context. It thus anticipates the appearance of
the LD motor primitives by a few seconds (see Fig. 12).
An interesting comparison can be carried out with the
method of McCall et al. [127], which shows that learning and
classification of the head pose helps to predict lane changes.
Simple trajectory forecasts produce discrimination power (DP)
equal to 0.95 at 2.5 s before lane change (95% detection
probability and 5% false-alarm rate in lane keeping). By in-
cluding head movement classification, the same DP is achieved
0.5 s earlier.
For trajectory forecast, a comparison may be attempted with
Fig. 8(c). This distribution potentially allows for derivation of
false-alarm rates and detection probabilities. For example, for a
vehicle keeping the lane at the center, the two horizontal lines
at −1.8 and +1.8 m represent the lane edges. The forecast
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Fig. 12. Anticipation of overtake, anticipation of lane change, and actual lane change for cases 2, 6, 10, 14, and 18 (left to right). First row: overtake intention
detected as second-level state transition (FollowObject to ClearObject behavior). Second row: lane change detected as motor primitive level transition (LD crossing
the lane). Third row: actual lane crossing.
co-driver trajectory falls outside of the lane at 5 s with 5%
probability (2.5% per side), which becomes 0.5% if the forecast
is considered at 2.5 s. Conversely, for a lane-change maneuver,
the left edge might look like the dashed s-shaped line (from
+1.8 to −1.8 m). Thus, an estimation of 97.5% detection
probability may be derived (as the proportion of trajectories
falling above the lane edge at the end).
However, this ideal situation is not achieved because the
vehicle starting position may be closer to one edge or may
follow a different profile. Indeed, the two false alarms occurred
within the example data set in such conditions. The situation is
actually clearer for motorways than complex curved geometries
due to greater quantities of perception noise and lower accuracy
of the forward emulator.
McCall (and others) use a classifier to predict the probability
of lane change, which is then binarized with a proper threshold
choice. Different thresholds produce different couplings of
detection probability and false-alarm rates, which are plotted
as receiver operator characteristic (ROC) curves.
Conversely, the co-driver of this paper returns one maneuver
from a discrete set of hypotheses. There is thus no equivalent
of thresholding and ROC curve calculation. The performance
estimated above must be considered as one point in the ROC
chart, representing an upper limit. On the other hand, the
reasoning leading to the estimation of performance gives an
insight into the factors that affect false-alarm rates and detection
probability, namely, lane geometry, initial position, maneuver
profile, etc.
Thus, further comparisons would be difficult to interpret,
given the different nature of the roads (narrower lanes, ramps,
roundabouts, etc.) and the unknown differences in the quality
of the perception system (in particular, we used a commercial
lane-recognition camera with significant lag, because this was
specifically designed for motorway use).
As for the higher-level cognitive intention recognition,
the effect of head-pose classification (action-to-goal) can be
compared with the (goal-to-action) prediction of the over-
taking maneuver. The latter appears to be more anticipa-
tory, as might be logically expected from a goal-to-action
approach.
V. DISCUSSION
A. Inference of Intentions
Perhaps the most wide-ranging conclusion concerns the na-
ture of the inference of intentions.
We have seen that the inference of intentions is achieved
within the co-driver by fitting observed behaviors onto sensory-
motor hypotheses of another agent. What is essentially taking
place is that the latter agent interprets the observed behavior in
terms of its own states that would produce it. Thus, attempting
to make the co-driver sensory-motor system as human-like as
possible is a precondition for its effectiveness, and studying
human motor strategies is an important related research field
(as it is in human–robot peer interactions).
One related point is that the hypotheses of the interpreting
agent may be limited in number or may not be complete,
thus missing or approximating the real case. This may hap-
pen even if the two agent’s sensory-motor systems are very
similar.
Approximations may arise from making a finite, limited, and
discrete set of hypotheses. Behavior is thus approximated by
the nearest hypothesis. However, if the discretization is made
with hypotheses that are qualitatively different (e.g., taking
one of two choices at a bifurcation), then this potentially
helps reject noise (e.g., any activity approximately equidistant
between two bifurcating roads is interpreted as either one of
the two).
The reason for generating a limited set of hypotheses may
also be because the dimensionality of the cognitive system
states is much greater than that of the motor output space.
Short-time observations of the motor output easily discriminate
between subsets in state space, but there are states that project
onto very similar motor outputs for a duration and would
require longer observations to be distinguished (i.e., states are
not equally observable). One example is the distinction between
sn,T and T in the LD primitive, which are not easily discrim-
inated during the short-term observations that are required for
our driver assistance application. This may be partly solved by
taking a “plausible” assumption for one of the two, which is
indeed what was done for T .
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Incomplete sensory-motor systems are lacking perception–
action loops for some layers of the ECOM architecture.
Fortunately, higher-level behaviors are composed of simpler
lower-level units, and thus, a system missing one behavior
such that it may not be able to model the intentions at that
level may instead be able to understand the single phases in
which it is decomposed. For example, in our model, there is no
built-in behavior for navigating around an object. However, this
functionality may be obtained with a sequence of lower-level
behaviors such as 1) clear object or change lane, 2) free flow
until the object is passed, and 3) lane change back again. As
a consequence, while the co-driver as implemented is literally
unable to model overtaking maneuvers, it yet understands the
single phases of the maneuver as they occur.
Fortunately, interpreting the situation in terms of lower-level
behaviors in this way still produces the correct interactions (for
example, if one driver begins the cut-in maneuver too early after
an overtake, the advice to “keep clear” is produced even if the
co-driver was not aware that it was the final part of a composite
maneuver).
Hence, the system is, to a large extent, robust against the
absence of high-level motor plans if these can be decomposed
into simpler units, of which the system is instead aware.
Despite this robustness, the question of scalability of the
system is important. In this respect, the proposed behavioral
architecture permits easy extension and scalability. It would not
be difficult, for instance, to design an “overtaking” maneuver,
which, just like the examples given in Section III, returns a
specific sequence of motor units when given a set of perceptual
goals. If such sequences can be associated with a compressed
perceptual parameter space [128], [129], then strict cognitive
bootstrapping is achieved, with spontaneous abstraction of the
perception–action hierarchy.
The topic of how to make the system capable of self-
extension is thus important and indeed central in artificial
cognitive studies. An interesting and relatively little-studied
possibility here would be using the forward models to retro-
spectively rehearse hypothetical situations (i.e., “rethinking”
past experiences).
B. Behaviors From Basic Principles
We noted before that our system’s “adaptive lane keeping”
originated from basic principles. This is not the only such case.
For instance, a system that works by producing human-like
behaviors is very likely to give rise to complex behaviors that
have not been explicitly programmed.
We have observed some of these, the most salient being,
perhaps, the case depicted in Fig. 7. The car obstacle remains
in the right lane, at the very beginning of a change of lane.
Nonetheless, the co-driver predicts its own and other road users’
behavior and comes to the conclusion that the car will block
in-lane maneuvers, requires braking, with the only available
alternative being changing to the right-hand lane. In subjective
human evaluation, the warning produced by the system was
indeed appreciated, being both appropriate and anticipated,
giving the impression that the system “understood” the road
situation and was able to correctly anticipate outcomes.
Fig. 13. Architecture of the co-driver for the H-metaphor.
C. Major Limitation
The system implemented suffers a number of limitations,
the most important being noise and inaccuracy of the sensorial
system. For example, a small error in the measurement of the
lateral speed of other vehicle has the potential to cause the
system to presume that the other driver is willing to change lane,
causing false alarms. We observed several such false alarms in
35 h of user tests.
Another limitation comes from incompleteness of the sen-
sorial data. For example, knowing only the geometry of the
host vehicle lane, and not that of the intersection lanes, caused
some false alarms in which vehicles moving to other lanes could
not be accurately predicted. A typical example is the entrance
of a roundabout where the vehicle leaving the roundabout in
the opposite lane may look like it is intersecting our lane. We
observed one such false alarm in the user tests.
The last set of limitations is a direct consequence of the
incompleteness and simplification of the sensory-motor system
of the co-driver. For example, the FO maneuver presumes that
the antagonist vehicle is moving with only little longitudinal
acceleration. If this is the case, then the small errors due to the
model assumptions (16) are corrected by the receding-horizon
scheme. However, it happened in the technical tests (prior to the
user tests) that the other vehicle performed a hard brake. The
co-driver thus continuously underestimated the deceleration
needed by the follow maneuver, resulting in a late warning
(however, this would also happen to humans if brake lights were
absent). A better tracking of objects combined with improved
motor primitives could of course fix this limitation.
VI. CONCLUSION AND IMPACTS
A. Impact of Co-Driver Technology
In the example given in Section III, the co-driver is used in
a limited form to produce a comprehensive preventive safety
system capable of giving information and warnings only.
However, co-drivers are potentially suited to more sophisti-
cated applications. Let us consider the application scheme given
in Fig. 13, where driver and co-driver sensory-motor activities
run in parallel, up to the point at which they are compared.
Thereafter, it is up the co-driver to control the vehicle; however,
this must be in accordance with the driver’s intentions. Driving
a system like this would resemble horse riding (the horse
“reads” the rider and complies with his/her intentions).
This can be achieved by extending layer III.6, implementing
the desired interactions after the inference of intentions.
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As in the rider–horse metaphor, a system like this could be
designed to complete maneuvers of which it had had hints from
the driver, just like the ESP work for chassis control, albeit at a
much higher cognitive level.
If necessary, the driver could “loosen” control (just like a
rider loosens the reins) and let the system autonomously nav-
igate, or “tighten” control (just as a rider tightens the reins) and
reclaim authority. If necessary, the system may be programmed
to completely take over from the driver in certain conditions.
In all cases, the driven vehicle should appear to be driven by
a human, thus being interpretable to other human road users.
The co-driver is thus the enabling technology for implement-
ing the speculative interactions proposed in [3]–[7].
The co-driver could have capabilities other than improving
human–vehicle interactions. In cooperative systems, co-drivers
could be used in a number of different ways, but principally
by exchanging intentions between co-driver-equipped vehicles.
This would improve much of the motor imagery, particularly
functions FollowObject, ClearObject, and so on. In a less direct
way, a co-driver could also be used to observe other road users
and infer their intention, e.g., in a way similar to (18) and (19)
but potentially much more effective overall.
Finally, the architecture in Fig. 4, if combined with learning
abilities (such as those demonstrated in DIPLECS), could be
used to rehearse critical situations, rare events, etc. The system
could use its emulation capacity (in a way similar to human re-
hearsing of possible experiences) to discover and learn higher-
level behaviors that might prove more effective.
This enables the co-driver to become an expert driver without
directly needing training examples from expert humans. If com-
bined with cooperative systems, this ability may also enable the
co-driver to analyze accident scenarios that rarely happen, thus
improving their overall motor strategy.
B. Final Remarks
In this position paper, we have attempted to set out a viable
roadmap for producing the co-driver enabling technology, mak-
ing significant use of recent developments in cognitive systems.
We have set out an example of a system that was developed
as part of a European Integrated Project, showing that at least
some of the basic co-driver functionality can be readily
achieved.
Other achievements will need further research at the intersec-
tion between cognitive sciences and intelligent vehicles.
APPENDIX I
A. Lateral Forward Model
For the lateral forward model, we adopt the steady-state
cornering equations of a classical bicycle model and make them
into a quasi-static model.
We may obtain the equations either by following a classical
steady-state cornering approach, such as in [100, Ch. 3.3], or
by neglecting the frequency dependence (i.e., by retaining only
the static gain) in the transfer functions of the vehicle lateral
response such as in [100, Ch. 3.4.2].
The resulting equations are projected in a curvilinear co-
ordinate system following the lane geometry, as was used in
[130, Sec. 3.2]. The resulting set of equations is thus
s˙n =u Sin(α)
α˙ = − κ(ss)
1 − snκ(ss)u Cos(α) + uΔ
Δ˙ =
1
k1 + k2u2
jΔ. (A1.1)
There are three state variables, namely, Δ, the curvature of
current trajectory; α, the angle between forward velocity and
the lane direction in the current position; and sn, the curvilinear
ordinate.
The lateral control input is jΔ, which is the steering rate (and
which is also proportional to the lateral jerk).
As is usual, when dealing with split lateral/longitudinal con-
trol (which is the case here), the vehicle speed u is considered
constant in (A1.1), and consequently, the curvilinear abscissa
sn is travel speed times the time t.
The equations in (A1.1), rather than accurately modeling the
lateral vehicle dynamics, aim at modeling how the human driver
understands the lateral control. The third equation says he/she
understands the curvature trajectory to be proportional to the
steering wheel angle, with a gain changing with the speed.
The constants k1 and k2 describe the vehicle under steering
behavior, accounting also for wheelbase and the steering wheel
ratio. These have been computed from the design parameters
of the vehicle and later checked against yaw rate and steer-
ing wheel angle recordings taken during the experiments. We
noticed that, if ignored or wrongly set, the co-driver forward
model did not match human trajectories. The third equation
in (A1.1) neglects the transient lateral phenomena that happen
in typically subsecond time frames (see [100, Ch. 3.4.2]),
which means that the driver is modeled as not being able to
afford and/or control them. This simplification is probably not
completely correct; however, it is adopted here because of the
resulting significant simplification of the equations. We propose
to evaluate ex-post the validity of such an assumption.
The second and first equations in (A1.1) simply compute the
relative orientation α and lateral displacement sn for lanes of
any given geometry, described by curvature κ(ss) (see [130],
for further details).
B. Longitudinal Forward Model
Equations for the longitudinal dynamics are straightforward
s˙s =u
u˙ = a
a˙ = jp. (A1.2)
These model the human driver as controlling the longi-
tudinal jerk, which is a nonlinear function of the gas and
brake pedal rate (we assume that the driver is able to invert
such nonlinarites to achieve a desired rate of change of the
acceleration).
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C. OC Motor Primitives
For the sake of clarity, this section gives an example of
the computation of motor primitives for the SM case (4).
Adaptation to other cases, i.e., (7), (12), and (14), is simple.
However, for lateral primitives, preliminary linearization of
(A1.1) is required to produce piecewise closed-form solutions.
We used a computer algebra system (Wolfram’s Mathemat-
ica), which also eased code generation.
Thus, equations (4)—which are the solution of the OC
problem (1) subject to boundary conditions (2) and (3) with
plant dynamics given by (A1.2)—are obtained by means of
the Calculus of Variations and Pontryagin’s minimum principle.
Thus
ss,SM =
−aoT 2 − 6uoT − 6uTT + 12xT
2
(
t
T
)5
+
3aoT 2 + 16uoT + 14uTT − 30xT
2
(
t
T
)4
+
−3aoT 2 − 12uoT − 8uTT + 20xT
2
(
t
T
)3
+
ao
2
t2 + uot
jp,SM = 30
−aoT 2 − 6uoT − 6uTT + 12xT
T 3
(
t
T
)2
+ 12
3aoT 2 + 16uoT + 14uTT − 30xT
T 3
(
t
T
)
+ 3−3aoT
2 − 12uoT − 8uTT + 20xT
T 3
. (A1.3)
Equations for velocity (u) and acceleration (a) are not ex-
plicitly shown in (A1.3), because they simply are the derivatives
of ss.
Since (1) is formulated as a free horizon problem, T , is
derived from minimization of (1) after substitution of the last
of (A1.3) in it, which provides a closed-form expression for the
integral, as
JS =wTT +
720(xT )2
T 5
− 720(uT + u0)xT
T 4
+
72a0u0 + 48a0uT
T 2
248(u0)
2 + 14u0uT + 8(uT )2 − 5a0xT
T 3
+
9(a0)2
T
T = argmin
T
JS . (A1.4)
Thus, T is indeed a function of wT , and so are (4).
APPENDIX II
A. Relation With Autonomous Driving
As indicated in the introduction, autonomous driving can be
regarded as one extreme point of an interaction spectrum (one
definition is, for example, given in SAE standard J3016).
Compared with other agents for fully autonomous driving,
the most distinctive aspect of a codriving agent lies in its ability
to interact with humans in an anticipative manner, implying a
range of novel scientific challenges.
As regards the societal necessity for co-drivers, it might
be argued that the introduction of partial automation would
constitute a key part of the roadmap aiming at full automa-
tion. However, even if full automation were available, a co-
driver agent would be able to carry out mixed initiatives
in addition to fully autonomous driving. From the user per-
spective, the user experience would be completely different,
with autonomous-only vehicles resembling taxi systems and
co-drivers resembling the rider–horse interaction (even when
acting at the full automation level). This might, in turn, motivate
the preference for co-driver systems in a large number of market
segments.
In addition, considering the interaction with vulnerable road
users, for example, pedestrians and cyclists, inference of inten-
tions in both directions cannot ultimately be omitted: Pedes-
trians and cyclists must predict maneuvers of vehicles, and
vice versa. Thus, inference of intentions based on mirroring
principles, which is perhaps the major contribution of this
paper, constitutes a potentially significant contribution for au-
tonomous vehicles.
Concerning trajectory planning, while the major focus of
autonomous vehicles has been on the planning of collision-
free maneuvers in dynamic environments with respect to the
limits of maneuverability and of the actuators, in the case of
mirroring, the focus is on the planning of maneuvers with
respect to the human sensory-motor limits (i.e., human-like
maneuvers).
The adoption of the Brooks subsumptive architecture, which
reuses collision-free atomic motor units, may be one way to
ensure safe higher-level behaviors in both cases (indeed it was
originally proposed for an autonomous robot [17]).
However, (and fortunately) humans do not use the whole
maneuverability envelope of the vehicle. For example, they use
a fraction of the tire friction [98], and they are also limited
in rate and in reaction time. Because of this, when mirroring
human driving, there are still maneuverability margins that can
be exploited by an autonomous intervention. Thus, preventive
safety and intervention potentially fall within the same concep-
tual framework of reproducing human driving, with maneuvers
beyond human limits (but within maneuverability limits) used
as a last resort (however, this paper has focused on the first
topic only).
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